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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the determinants of agricultural land price in several regions in France over the 
period 1994-2011, using individual plot transaction data, with a particular emphasis on agricultural 
subsidies and nitrate zoning regulations. It found a positive but relatively small capitalisation effect of 
the total subsidies per hectare. The data revealed that agricultural subsidies capitalised, at least to 
some extent, but the magnitude of such a capitalisation depends on the region considered, on the type 
of subsidy considered, and on the location of the plot in a nitrate surplus zone or not. Only land set-
aside premiums significantly capitalise into land price, while single farm payments have a significant 
positive capitalisation impact only for plots located in a nitrate-surplus zone. 
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The Influence of Agricultural Support on 
Sale Prices of French Farmland: 
A comparison of different subsidies, accounting for 
the role of environmental and land regulations 
Laure Latruffe, Laurent Piet, Pierre Dupraz and 
Chantal Le Mouël∗ 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 51/June 2013 
1. Introduction 
The influence of agricultural subsidies on farm land prices is a question that has attracted a 
large body of research in the economic literature. The main issue is whether, and by how 
much, the subsidies increase agricultural land prices. A positive influence on price would 
indeed reveal that part of the subsidies are capitalised into land prices, indicating that land 
owners are beneficiaries of part of the public support, while it is in general not intended by 
governments. While this leakage of public funds to potentially non- or former-agricultural 
stakeholders instead of supporting active farmers’ income is problematic, the increase of land 
prices caused by subsidies is, in addition, detrimental to young farmers willing to settle. 
The literature is relatively consistent regarding the empirical evidence of the capitalisation of 
public subsidies into land prices. For example, Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) provided a 
review of the existing empirical studies, and concluded that in the empirical literature 
government subsidies are major contributors to agricultural land price increases, and are 
generally found to account for 15-30% of the price of land. 
This article aims at contributing to the empirical literature about the capitalisation of public 
subsidies in farm land sale prices, using a unique database of land transactions for several 
French regions in the period 1994-2011. Our contribution is threefold. 
Firstly, we provide a recent analysis of the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into land 
sale prices in France. With the exceptions of Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné (1992) and 
Cavailhès and Degoud (1995), no studies have investigated the effect of public support on 
agricultural land prices in France. Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné (1992) found a positive effect 
of wheat producer support estimate (PSE) on farm land prices in various regions in the 
United States, Canada and France (NUTS21 regions Centre and Picardie) over the period 
1979-1989. Cavailhès and Degoud (1995) gave evidence of the capitalisation of support from 
the 1992 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform in agricultural land prices in France. 
Moreover, theoretical studies such as Dewbre et al. (2001), Courleux et al. (2008), Kilian and 
Salhofer (2008) or Ciaian and Kancs (2012) consider the rental market of land and not the 
sale market. 
                                                        
∗ Laure Latruffe, Pierre Dupraz and Chantal Le Mouël are Researchers and Laurent Piet is a Research 
Analyst at INRA (French National Institute for Agricultural Research). 
The authors are grateful to Sylvain Cariou for his help in processing the data. 
1 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) provides a single uniform breakdown of 
territorial units for the production of regional statistics for the EU. In France, NUTS2 corresponds to 
the French administrative regions (“régions”), NUTS3 corresponds to the French administrative sub-
regions (“départements”) and NUTS4 corresponds to the French administrative districts (“cantons”). 
France (excluding overseas territories) consists of 22 NUTS2 regions and 96 NUTS3 regions. 
(source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction). 
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Secondly, we consider several types of subsidies. The extended period 1994-2012 enables 
taking into account various forms of subsidies since their introduction, including rural 
development subsidies and Single Farm Payment (SFP). The existing studies generally focus 
on the total amount of subsidies provided to the agricultural sector or on one type of 
subsidies only. It could however be expected that different subsidies contribute differently to 
increasing land prices due to their different objective and implementation scheme and 
schedule. One can cite the study of the effect of direct payments on farm land rentals in 
Northern Ireland in 1994-2002 by Patton et al. (2008), who found that less favoured area 
(LFA) payments had a stronger positive impact on rentals than sheep premiums and beef and 
suckler cow premiums. These authors also provided evidence of a negative impact of 
slaughter premiums. Based on experts’ opinions, Latruffe et al. (2008) indicated that in 
France in 2003-2007 the impact of various types of public support on agricultural land prices 
was differentiated, ranging from weak positive impact (SFP and coupled payments) to no 
impact (rural development payments including environmental payments and LFA 
payments). 
Thirdly, we investigate the issue of public support capitalisation taking into account the fact 
that the market for farm land is affected by regulations, relating to land or not. As stressed by 
Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) the influence of government support in farm land prices 
depends on the “land management laws and policies” in force in the region considered, as 
such regulations may affect the degree of land mobility between alternative land uses. These 
include, for example, prohibited land ownership for specific entities, regulated prices and 
pre-emptive rights for specific buyers (Ciaian et al., 2012). In France in particular, land 
regulations are among the strongest in Europe (Van Herck et al., 2012). Zoning regulations 
are also policies that may restrict the mobility of land uses. Considering the French NUTS2 
region of Brittany as a case study, Latruffe et al. (2013) give evidence of a positive impact on 
agricultural land prices of zoning in the frame of the Nitrate Directive regulation. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the case study regions and the land 
price database that we used. Section 3 specifies the estimation methodology implemented. In 
section 4 estimation results are analysed. Finally section 5 concludes. 
2. The case study regions and the land price database 
2.1 The case study regions 
We use data from individual land sale transactions in several regions in France. These 
regions are very different in terms of farm structures and production specialisations and 
therefore in terms of main subsidies received, but also in terms of non-agricultural pressure 
on land. Figure 1 shows the studied regions’ location in France and their main agricultural 
productions in 2010. Table 1 provides some characteristics for the regions in 2010, as well as 
a comparison to France as a whole.  
- Brittany is a NUTS2 region located in Western France consisting of four NUTS3 sub-
regions. The region has a strong agricultural character, with 61.8% of the region area being 
utilised agricultural area (UAA), compared to the French average of 51.4%. The farming 
structures are characterised by medium-size farms (47.6 hectares), young farmers, and dairy 
and granivores as main types of farming. A large part of the region’s area is built land or 
other types of developed land. The urban and agricultural pressures on agricultural land are 
stronger in Brittany, due to its attractiveness for new inhabitants and for tourism, and due to 
the important livestock dejections which urge farmers to find manure spreading surfaces. 
- Limousin, a NUTS2 region in Central France consisting of three NUTS3 sub-regions, is 
characterised by hilly landscape and cattle (beef and sheep) raising. A large part of the 
region’s area is covered with permanent grass. Farms are middle-sized and own a larger 
share of their land, on average, than in the rest of France. They received on average more 
coupled direct payments to crops and livestock, in particular due to the suckler cow 
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premium, and more LFA and agri-environmental payments to extensive grazing livestock, 
than in NUTS2 Brittany. 
- Meuse is a NUTS3 region in Eastern France. As it is a NUTS3 region, compared to NUTS2 
regions Brittany and Limousin, it has a smaller area and fewer farms. Farms are on average 
large (110.6 hectares) and tenanted. Field crop production, in particular production of 
cereals, oilseeds and protein crops prevails, followed by dairy farming. Arable and pasture 
land is on average less expensive than in the two other regions studied. 
France has applied a two-stage zoning based on the European Nitrate Directive. 
Municipalities are first classified as belonging to a vulnerable zone or not. In such zones, the 
use of land for specific purposes may be prohibited, and farming practices may be restricted. 
The second stage, the nitrate surplus zoning (acronym ZES, for French “zone d’excédent 
structurel”) which includes municipalities where nitrate from livestock source exceeds 170 kg 
per hectare of UAA, imposes stricter regulations. Brittany is affected by livestock pollution, 
resulting in the whole region classified as a vulnerable zone, and half of its municipalities 
coming under the nitrate surplus zoning. By contrast, NUTS3 Meuse is only partly classified 
in vulnerable zone (48% of its municipalities) but is not concerned by the nitrate surplus 
zoning, and NUTS2 Limousin is not classified in either zoning. 
 
Figure 1. Location and main types of farming of the regions studied 
 
Source: authors’ 2010 SSP agricultural census – ©IGN 2011, Geofla® 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the case study regions and comparison to France in 2009, 
2010 or 2012 
 France NUTS2 
region 
Brittany 
NUTS2 
region 
Limousin 
NUTS3 
region 
Meuse 
Average population density (inhabitants per 
square kilometre) a 114.0 116.7 43.8 31.2 
Area (hectares) b 54,219,946 2,750,640 1,705,841 621,319 
Share of UAA (cultivated land and 
permanent grassland) in area (%) b 51.4 61.8 49.6 56.4 
Share of permanent grassland in area (%) b 17.2 9.4 35.2 16.6 
Share of developed land in area (%) b 8.9 12.4 7.0 3.9 
Share of municipalities located in vulnerable 
zone in 2012 (%) c n.a. 100 0 48.0 
Share of municipalities located in nitrate 
surplus zone in 2012 (%) c n.a. 50.3 0 0 
Number of farms d 489,977 34,447 14,641 2,975 
Average UAA per farm (hectares) d 55.0 47.6 57.3 110.6 
Share of UAA that is owned (%) d 23.3 22.5 37.5 13.8 
Share of farmers aged 60 years or more (%)d 22.0 11.9 20.3 19.7 
Shares of farms according to main 
production (%) d:     
Cereals, oilseeds and protein crops 17.3 9.4 2.4 29.0 
Dairy 10.3 29.6 3.1 10.9 
Beef cattle 12.1 7.5 49.5 6.7 
Sheep and goat 6.2 2.4 13.8 4.8 
Pork and poultry 4.3 19.0 2.3 1.5 
Average subsidies per hectare of UAA 
(Euros) b,e:     
CAP first-pillar coupled direct payments 
to crops and herds 33.5 13.0 106.3 17.3 
CAP first-pillar decoupled SFP 245.1 308.6 194.8 254.4 
CAP second-pillar LFA 19.1 0 50.0 0 
CAP second-pillar agri-environmental 
payments to extensive grazing livestock 8.5 0.2 25.2 1.1 
Total subsidies 334.5 350.8 403.3 290.4 
Average price of non-built arable and 
pasture land for plots above 0.7 hectares 
(Euros per hectare) f: 
    
Land without a farmer tenant 5,120 4,660 5,770 3,930 
Land with a farmer tenant 3,720 3,770 3,090 3,320 
Note: “n.a.” means not available. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on a 2009 French Statistical Office INSEE, b 2010 Teruti-Lucas, c official 
law, d 2010 agricultural census, e 2010 Statistique Agricole Annuelle, and f 2010 SAFER-SSP-Terres 
d’Europe-SCAFR-INRA (SAFER-Agreste, 2012). Figures for France exclude overseas territories. 
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2.2 The land price database 
The land price database that we used was obtained from notaries (the “PERVAL” database) 
and consists of all transactions of agricultural land that occurred in the regions over the 
period studied. We considered only arable and pasture land (that is to say we excluded 
vineyards), that was non-built, and already tenanted by a farmer or not. During the period 
studied, 1994-2011, about 1,600 transactions occurred per year in NUTS2 Brittany, 400 in 
NUTS2 Limousin and 300 in NUTS3 Meuse. 
The variable of interest, land price, was expressed per hectare as the ratio of sale price to sold 
area. It was deflated by the consumer price index with base 100 in 1998. We excluded 
transactions where the sale price was zero. In addition, outliers for the sale price and the sold 
area were removed based on visual inspection. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the area sold and the land price in the database 
after exclusion of inconsistent data and outliers. Relating the number of transactions to the 
UAA in the region shows that, during the period studied, NUTS2 region Limousin had a less 
active agricultural land market: 7.8 transactions per 100 hectares of UAA occurred, while 
figures for NUTS2 Brittany and NUTS3 Meuse are respectively 16.6 and 14.1. In all regions 
considered, plots sold were on average 4.1 hectares large. Larger plots were sold on average in 
NUTS3 region Meuse (5.3 hectares) and smaller plots in NUTS2 region Brittany (3.14 
hectares). The average price of land sold is 5,595 Euros per hectare in the whole sample. It is 
lower on average in NUTS2 region Limousin (4,229 Euros) and higher in NUTS3 region 
Meuse (6,573 Euros). Some very small parcels (as small as 0.0005 hectare) and some very 
expensive parcels (up to 198,378 Euros per hectare) were sold during the period. 
As shown by Figure 2, the smallest plots exchanged were sold at very high price, reflecting 
that future conversion to development use is highly probable for such plots. It is therefore 
meaningless to investigate the influence of agricultural subsidies on the price of those plots. 
For this reason, we restricted the database to plots with an area equal or above 10 hectares2. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the area sold and the land price in this restricted 
database. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of area sold and land price for all transactions over the period 
1994-2011 
 All regions 
together 
NUTS2 region 
Brittany 
NUTS2 region 
Limousin 
NUTS3 
region Meuse 
Number of observations 39,749 28,209 6,594 4,946 
Sold area (hectares) 
Average 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
 
4.1 
7.2 
0.0005 
147.1 
 
3.4 
6.1 
0.0005 
137.1 
 
4.6 
8.7 
0.0013 
133.2 
 
5.3 
10.1 
0.0007 
147.1 
Price per hectare (Euros) 
Average 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
 
5,595 
12,640 
46 
198,378 
 
5,743 
12,700 
52 
198,379 
 
4,229 
10,353 
46 
185,017 
 
6,573 
14,756 
74 
195,014 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the notary land transactions’ database PERVAL. 
                                                        
2 We tried lower cutting values for the area but the regression results obtained were not significant in 
general and the R-squared were less than 5%. 
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of sale price per hectare and sold area in total sample 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the notary land transactions’ database PERVAL. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of area sold and land price for transactions of plots with a 
size equal or above 10 hectares over the period 1994-2011 
 All regions 
together 
NUTS2 region 
Brittany 
NUTS2 region 
Limousin 
NUTS3 region 
Meuse 
Number of observations 4,285 2,772 774 739 
Sold area (hectares) 
Average 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
 
19.9 
12.6 
10.0 
147.1 
 
18.4 
9.7 
10.0 
137.1 
 
22.3 
15.7 
10.0 
133.2 
 
22.6 
16.9 
10.0 
147.1 
Price per hectare (Euros) 
Average 
Standard deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
 
2,795 
1,591 
46 
30,639 
 
3,092 
1,675 
115 
30,639 
 
1,870 
1,267 
46 
13,247 
 
2,652 
1,105 
74 
13,800 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the notary land transactions’ database PERVAL. 
The share of transactions of plots sized 10 hectares or more is 9.8% in NUTS2 Brittany, 11.2% 
in NUTS2 Limousin and 15.6% in NUTS3 Meuse. In all regions considered, plots sold with a 
size equal or above 10 hectares were on average 19.9 hectares large and priced 2,795 Euros 
per hectares. Smaller plots on average were sold in NUTS2 region Brittany (18.4 hectares 
against 22.3 and 22.6 in NUTS2 Limousin and NUTS3 Meuse respectively) but they were 
more expensive on average (3,092 Euros per hectare against 1,870 and 2,652 in NUTS2 
Limousin and NUTS3 Meuse respectively). 
Among others, the occupations of both the seller and the buyer are transaction characteristics 
which are available in the land sales database. From these data, and consistent with the 
figures provided by Courleux (2011) at the national level, it appears that two thirds of the 
plots are bought by farmers. In France specific private bodies have the public mission to 
regulate the transactions in order to limit price speculation, avoid farm fragmentation and 
0
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favour young farmers’ settlement. Each transaction is notified to these bodies, called the 
SAFER (French acronym standing for “Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement 
Rural”), which operate at the NUTS3 level. If the SAFER reckons that the transaction is a 
threat to farm consolidation or settlement, or may be governed by price speculation, then it 
can stop the transaction. It then tries to convince the seller and buyer to change the 
transaction on an amicable basis, and, if not possible, it pre-empts the plot and has 5 years to 
sell it back at a lower price or to another buyer (for more details on the SAFER, see Latruffe 
and Le Mouël, 2006). In the PERVAL database, the SAFER intervenes (by buying or re-
selling a plot) in 16% of the transactions. 
The municipality where the plot is located is also available in the database PERVAL. It 
enables to relate each transaction to the agricultural subsidies and revenue estimated in the 
first stage of the analysis, and to other variables such as the municipality’s demographic 
characteristics and the zoning it may come under.  
3. Methodology and other data 
3.1 First stage: estimation of agricultural revenue and subsidies 
Data regarding agricultural subsidies and revenue are not directly available from public 
statistics at the municipality level but rather at the NUTS3 level. In order to use an 
approximation of subsidies received and revenue generated by farms in the municipality 
where the plot is located as explanatory variables in our land price regression, we performed 
a first stage estimation of subsidies and revenue. 
On the opposite to subsidies and revenue, data regarding cultivated areas for crops and head 
numbers for herds are available at both levels, NUTS3 and municipality. Therefore, crop 
areas and livestock head numbers were used to reconstruct the subsidies and revenue at the 
municipality level with a two-step procedure: firstly, NUTS3 data were used to perform 
regressions; secondly, the resulting estimated coefficients were used to generate projections 
at the municipality level. 
The first step was conducted as follows. At the NUTS3 level, agricultural subsidies and 
revenue were collected from the regional agricultural accounts database (or CRA, acronym 
for the French source “Comptes Régionaux de l’Agriculture”), and cultivated areas for crops 
and head numbers for herds were collected from the annual agricultural production survey 
(or SAA, acronym for the French source “Statistique Agricole Annuelle”). All variables at the 
NUTS3 level were extracted for the years 1994-2011. Six types of subsidies could be 
considered from the CRA database: 
i) CAP first-pillar coupled direct payments to crops and herds (noted CHP); 
ii) CAP first-pillar land set-aside premiums (LSA); 
iii) CAP first-pillar decoupled single farm payments (SFP); 
iv) CAP second-pillar least favoured area payments (LFA); 
v) CAP second-pillar agri-environmental payments to extensive grazing livestock (EGL); 
vi) total agricultural subsidies (TOT). 
The only agricultural revenue variable available in the CRA database is the pre-tax profit, 
which includes subsidies. In order to avoid double counting, a pre-tax profit excluding 
subsidies was created by subtracting total agricultural subsidies (TOT) from the pre-tax profit 
available in the CRA database. The six subsidy variables ݏݑܾݏ௜,௥  and the revenue variable ݎ݁ݒ௥ 
were deflated by the consumer price index with base 100 in 1998. They were then regressed 
on crop areas and herd numbers as a system of stacked equations using the non linear 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimator as follows: 
ቊ
ݏݑܾݏ௜,௥ ൌ ∑ ߙ௜,௖ ൈ ൫ܽݎ݁ܽ௖,௥. ݀௜,௥൯௖ ൅ ∑ ߙ௜,௛ ൈ ൫݄݁ܽ݀ݏ௛,௥. ݀௜,௥൯௛ ൅ ݑ௜,௥
ݎ݁ݒ௥ ൌ ∑ ߚ௖ ൈ ܽݎ݁ܽ௖,௥௖ ൅ ∑ ߚ௛ ൈ ݄݁ܽ݀ݏ௛,௥௛ ൅ ݒ௥
  (1) 
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where ݅, ݎ, ܿ and ݄ are indexes for, respectively, the six subsidy types (CPH, LSA, SFP, LFA, 
EGL, and TOT), NUTS3 regions, crops and herds; ݀௜,௥ is a dummy variable with ݀௜,௥ ൌ 0 if 
ݏݑܾݏ௜,௥ ൌ 0 and ݀௜,௥ ൌ 1 if ݏݑܾݏ௜,௥ ൐ 0; ߙ௜,௖, ߙ௜,௛, ߚ௖ and ߚ௛ are the parameters to be estimated; 
and ݑ௜,௥ and ݒ௥ are standard error terms. Because subsidies are non negative, we imposed 
that ߙ௜,௖ ൐ 0 and ߙ௜,௛ ൐ 0 by actually estimating ܽ௜,௖ ൌ ln ሺߙ௜,௖ሻ and ܽ௜,௛ ൌ ln ሺߙ௜,௛ሻ rather than 
ߙ௜,௖ and ߙ௜,௛ as such. 
The second step then consisted in using the estimated coefficients ߙො௜,௖ ൌ exp ሺ ොܽ௜,௖ሻ, ߙො௜,௛ ൌ
exp ሺ ොܽ௜,௛ሻ, ߚመ௖ and ߚመ௛ to compute the subsidies and revenue projected at the municipality level: 
ቊ
ݏݑܾݏ෫ ௜,௠ሺ௥ሻ ൌ ∑ ߙො௜,௖ ൈ ൫ܽݎ݁ܽ௖,௠ሺ௥ሻ. ݀௜,௥൯௖ ൅ ∑ ߙො௜,௛ ൈ ൫݄݁ܽ݀ݏ௛,௠ሺ௥ሻ. ݀௜,௥൯௛
ݎ݁ݒ෦ ௠ሺ௥ሻ ൌ ∑ ߚመ௖ ൈ ܽݎ݁ܽ௖,௠ሺ௥ሻ௖ ൅ ∑ ߚመ௛ ൈ ݄݁ܽ݀ݏ௛,௠ሺ௥ሻ௛
 (2) 
where ݉ሺݎሻ means that the municipality indexed by ݉ is located in the NUTS3 region ݎ. At 
the municipality level, the cultivated areas for crops and the head numbers for herds were 
collected from the agricultural census databases (or RA, acronym for the French 
“Recensement de l’Agriculture”) for years 2000 and 2010. 
Both steps were repeated for two sub-periods, 1994-2005 on the one hand and 2006-2011 on 
the other hand, for three reasons. Firstly, the CAP underwent an important reform in 2003, 
the Luxembourg agreement, which was implemented in France from 2006 onward (with, 
among other things, the introduction of the decoupled SFP and the abandonment of the land 
set-aside obligation); therefore, it seemed important to allow coefficients to vary from one 
sub-period to the other. Secondly, the nomenclature of crops and herds used in the SAA 
slightly differs from one sub-period to the other so that we could not always use the same 
regressors for the whole period. Thirdly, because the RA is conducted every ten years only, 
crop areas and herd numbers at the municipality level were available for 2000 and 2010 
only; therefore, subsidies and revenue were projected thanks to the 2000 RA figures for the 
first sub-period and thanks to the 2010 RA figures for the second sub-period. 
Finally, because, on the one hand, the nomenclature of crops and herds neither is fully 
consistent between SAA and RA and, on the other hand, a lot of product-specific data is 
missing at the municipality level for statistical secret reasons, the SUR estimations were 
conducted in two stages. A first set of crops and herds was identified in the SAA typology as 
regressors leading to the best SUR estimation results. Then, the system of equations was re-
estimated with a subset of these regressors only, so that the NUTS3 level consolidated 
projections of subsidies and revenue were consistent with the original predicted figures, or, 
formally: 
 ቊ
∑ ݏݑܾݏ෫௜,௠ሺ௥ሻ௠ሺ௥ሻ ؄ ݏݑܾݏ෣ ௜,௥ ؠ ∑ ߙො௜,௖כ ൈ ൫ܽݎ݁ܽ௖כ,௥. ݀௜,௥൯௖כ ൅ ∑ ߙො௜,௛כ ൈ ൫݄݁ܽ݀ݏ௛כ,௥. ݀௜,௥൯௛כ
∑ ݎ݁ݒ෦ ௠ሺ௥ሻ௠ሺ௥ሻ ؄ ݎ݁ݒෞ ௥ ؠ ∑ ߚመ௖כ ൈ ܽݎ݁ܽ௖כ,௥௖כ ൅ ∑ ߚመ௛כ ൈ ݄݁ܽ݀ݏ௛כ,௥௛כ
 (3) 
where ܿכ and ݄כ constitute a subset of ܿ and ݄ respectively. Table A1 in Appendix reports the 
results of the SUR estimations for both sub-periods and with the best and optimal sets of 
crop and herd regressors. 
3.2 Second stage: estimation of the determinants of land price 
The dependent variable used for the second-stage estimation was the deflated price per 
hectare of agricultural land sold for plots with an area of 10 hectares or above. The 
explanatory variables which were expected a priori to influence land price are, firstly, the 
basic determinants of land price based on the present value model (Weersink et al., 1999; 
Plantinga and Miller, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2003): on the one hand, revenue from 
agricultural use, which is separated in a market-based component (M) and a government-
based component (G); and, on the other hand, potential revenue from non-agricultural use. 
Both components of agricultural revenue, M and G, were estimated in the first stage. M was 
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proxied by the projected pre-tax profit excluding subsidies which we call revenue. G was 
proxied by the projected subsidies separated in six categories as explained above: CHP, LSA, 
SFP, LFA, EGL and TOT. The total subsidy variable was included in one regression in order 
to explore the influence of all subsidies, while the five categories CHP, LSA, SFP, LFA and 
EGL were included in another regression in order to compare their respective capitalisation 
effect. In order to account for the size of the municipality, the revenue and subsidies variables 
were divided by the municipalities’ UAA. All these variables representing income generated 
by land were expected to increase the price of land. Outliers for these variables were removed 
by visual inspection. 
Potential revenue from non-agricultural use was not observed. For this reason, following the 
literature, we proxied it by two variables: the population density in the municipality where 
the plot is located, and a dummy indicating whether the municipality is part of an urban area 
or not3. We expected that both variables have a positive influence on the price of land, as they 
represent the potential opportunity to convert land for development. 
In addition to these basic determinants, we controlled for the size of the plot sold, whether 
the buyer was a farmer, and the municipality’s area. The expected influence of the first 
variable on the price of land was ambiguous. On the one hand, large plots may be highly 
valued due to economies of scale that may be generated during agricultural production; on 
the other hand, smaller plots may be more easily manageable and sellable, particularly in 
view of housing development. We expected that the buyer being a farmer should decrease the 
price of land as farmers are mostly interested to farm the land in the future rather than 
converting it to non-agricultural uses. The municipality’s area was expected to decrease the 
land price, as a lower competition for land may occur in larger municipalities. 
We considered regulations that may affect the price of agricultural land. The first regulation 
variable related to zoning based on the Nitrate Directive. The zoning dummy variable took 
the value one if the municipality was in the nitrate surplus zone, and the value zero 
otherwise. The second regulation variable considered took the value one if the seller or the 
buyer was a local SAFER, and zero otherwise. One objective of the paper is to investigate 
whether the capitalisation of subsidies is influenced by regulations. For this reason, we also 
tested the inclusion of the two regulation variables in interaction with the subsidy variables. 
However, based on non-significance, we included in the final model the zoning dummy 
interacted with the subsidies but not the dummy alone; also, we included the SAFER dummy 
variable alone but not its interaction with the subsidies. 
Finally, we included year dummies and NUTS3 region dummies, but we do not report the 
corresponding results. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the land price 
regression for the sample considered (plots with size equal or above 10 hectares) during the 
whole period 1994-2011. The average projected agricultural revenue per hectare of UAA in 
the municipality where the plot is located was 218 Euros, a positive value which is mainly due 
to the high value in NUTS2 Brittany (345 Euros, against 49 and -86 Euros in NUTS2 
Limousin and NUTS3 Meuse respectively). The level of total subsidies was, by contrast to the 
revenue, more homogenous across the three regions considered: between 218 and 248 Euros 
per hectare of UAA in the municipality. LFA payments and agri-environmental payments for 
extensive grazing livestock (EGL) were present almost only in NUTS2 Limousin. NUTS2 
Brittany is highly populated, and this is confirmed by the municipalities’ population density 
and the share of municipalities located in urban areas, which were much higher in this region 
compared to the other two regions. Also, as mentioned above, NUTS2 Brittany is affected by 
livestock pollution and the whole region is classified as vulnerable zone. Regarding the 
nitrate surplus zoning, 60% of the municipalities of the database were in such a zone. Two 
thirds of the municipalities of NUTS3 Meuse sample were classified in vulnerable zone and 
                                                        
3 The information is rarely available. The most recent information is from 2010 and is used for all 
years 1994-2011. An urban area is defined as an area providing at least 10,000 jobs. 
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none in nitrate surplus zone, and no municipalities of NUTS2 Limousin sample were 
classified in either zoning. Plots were mainly purchased by farmers (two thirds of the 
transactions), and the SAFER bodies intervened in 16% of the transactions (by purchasing or 
re-selling land). 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the land price regression 
for plots with size equal or above 10 hectares over the period 1994-2011 
 All 
regions 
together 
NUTS2 
region 
Brittany 
NUTS2 
region 
Limousin 
NUTS3 
region 
Meuse 
Plot’s municipality’s projected agricultural 
revenue per hectare of UAA (Euros per 
hectare): mean in the sample a 
218 345 49 -86 
Plot’s municipality’s agricultural subsidies 
per hectare of UAA(Euros per hectare): mean 
in the sample a 
    
CHP 137 136 144 133 
LSA 7 8 1 9 
SFP 68 77 30 74 
LFA 5 0 28 0 
EGL 3 0 17 1 
TOT 243 248 246 218 
Plot’s municipality’s area (hectares): mean in 
the sample b 3,192 3,595 3,223 1,653 
Plot’s municipality’s population density 
(inhabitants per square kilometre): mean in 
the sample b 
57 73 27 26 
Plot’s municipality located in urban area: 
share (%) in the sample b 4 5 2 0 
Plot’s municipality located in zoning areas: 
share (%) in the sample c 
    
In vulnerable zone 76 100 0 66 
In nitrate surplus zone 39 60 0 0 
Plots purchased by a farmer: share (%) in the 
sample d 66 65 62 77 
Plots purchased or sold by a SAFER: share 
(%) in the sample d 16 15 27 11 
Notes: the share of farms located in vulnerable zone is shown here but the dummy related to this share is 
not included as an explanatory variable; by contrast, the size of the plot sold, not shown here but in Table 2, 
is included as an explanatory variable; interacted variables included as explanatory variables are not shown 
here. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on a SSP, SAA 1994-2011 and SSP, CRA 1994-2011, b French statistical 
office INSEE, c official regulation, and d the notary land transactions’ database PERVAL 
 
4. Results 
Tables 5 and 6 report the regression results of the second stage which consists in the 
estimation of the determinants of the land price for plots sized 10 hectares or more. Table 5 
regards the regression where the total subsidy variable is included as an explanatory variable, 
while Table 6 regards the regression where the various categories of subsidies are used 
instead. In both cases, the model was estimated for all three regions altogether, and for each 
region separately. All models were highly significant and their R-squared values ranged 
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between 0.133 and 0.275. The model explained the variation in land price the most for 
NUTS2 Limousin and the least for NUTS2 region Brittany. 
Considering firstly the results for the sample including all regions together, Table 5 shows 
that the projected agricultural revenue per hectare (at the municipality level) does not have a 
significant influence on the price of land. By contrast, the projected total agricultural 
subsidies per hectare (at the municipality level) have a positive influence. The coefficient is 
0.6853, indicating the existence of capitalisation of subsidies in land price. The extent of 
capitalisation is rather small however and there is a strong dilution effect: considering the 
most simplifying assumptions of the PVM4, our estimated coefficient of the total subsidy 
variable represents the capitalisation effect of a one Euro subsidy increase discounted over an 
infinite horizon. Hence, excluding the discount effect, the “pure” capitalisation effect remains 
very limited: for a 4% discount rate for instance, a one Euro subsidy increase induces a 0.027 
Euro increase in the price of land. As reported by Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) this dilution 
may be due to land supply price elasticity, input substitution possibilities, conditional 
requirements that farmers have to fulfil in order to receive the payments (e.g. cross 
compliance), and partial absorption of the capitalisation by input suppliers. However, this 
diluted effect of 0.027 is only for land located outside nitrate surplus zones, as the coefficient 
of the interaction between the dummy relating to this zoning and the total subsidy variable is 
significant. The coefficient of this interacted variable is 1.3693, indicating that the subsidy 
coefficient is 2.0546 in the nitrate surplus zones. Hence, in such zones, that is to say for 39 
percent of the plots exchanged (which are all located in NUTS2 Brittany), the capitalisation 
effect is three times the effect outside the zoning. In the zoning, keeping a 4% discount rate, a 
one Euro subsidy rise increases the price of land by 0.082 Euro. This confirms the usual 
theoretical result (see, e.g., Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006) that the lower the land supply 
elasticity, that is to say the lower the mobility of land between uses, then the higher the 
capitalisation effect. The zoning regulation may indeed reduce land mobility, and therefore 
increase the capitalisation of subsidies in such areas. 
Regarding the other explanatory variables, results in Table 5 show that, for all regions taken 
together, the size of the plot has a negative influence on land price per hectare, suggesting 
increased competition on the demand side for smaller plots. The area of the municipality 
where the plot is located also negatively influences the price of land, confirming the 
expectation that competition for land is lower in larger municipalities. The variables which 
proxy revenue from potential non-agricultural uses, namely the municipality’s population 
density and the location in an urban area, both have a positive influence on land price, as 
expected. Also conforming to intuition, plots purchased by farmers are less expensive as 
farmers buy land for agricultural use and not for future development uses. Finally, plots 
purchased or re-sold by a SAFER are more expensive. This finding is counterintuitive as the 
SAFER are expected to contribute to alleviate speculation on land prices. Two reasons may 
explain this finding. Firstly, the SAFER do not always use their pre-emptive right in the view 
of keeping land price low; they may also pre-empt land that is up for sale to change the buyer, 
in order to limit farm fragmentation and support young farmers’ settlements. Secondly, 
SAFER’s intervention in the view of keeping low price may occur for specific land, which is 
more expensive than the average agricultural land, for example land located in peri-urban 
areas. 
                                                        
4 According to the PVM, the equilibrium price of an asset at the beginning of time period t (Lt) may be 
written as: ܮ௧ ൌ ∑
ாሺோ೟శ೔ሻ
ሺଵା௥೟శభሻሺଵା௥೟శమሻ……ሺଵା௥೟శ೔ሻ
∞
୧ୀ଴ , where Rt is the net real return at the end of time period t 
(including government subsidies), generated from owning the asset, rt is the time-varying real 
discount rate for year t and E is the expectation on return conditional on information in period t. If it is 
assumed that the net return is constant in each period (R*), that the discount rate is constant, that 
agents are risk neutral and that differential tax treatments of capital gains and rental income are 
ignored, then the present value formula simplifies to the basic capitalisation formula: ܮ௧ ൌ
ோכ
௥
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Table 5 also reports estimation results for the three regions separately. The main difference 
between the regions is the effect of the total subsidies on land price. In NUTS2 Brittany, there 
is evidence of the capitalisation of subsidies only in nitrate surplus zones, with a coefficient of 
1.6144 (i.e., 0.065 Euro capitalised in land price for a one Euro subsidy increase, provided 
that the discount rate is 4%). In the two other regions, the subsidies are capitalised in non-
nitrate surplus zones (as nitrate surplus zones do not exist in the regions) with a 
differentiated effect. In NUTS3 region Meuse, the coefficient of the subsidy variable is 0.9539 
(i.e., 0.038 Euro capitalised in land price for a one Euro subsidy increase, provided that the 
discount rate is 4%), while in NUTS2 region Limousin, the effect is greater: the coefficient 
being 1.2346, meaning 0.049 Euro capitalised in land price for a one Euro subsidy increase 
(provided that the discount rate is 4%). 
Table 6 presents the estimation results when various categories of subsidies are included as 
explanatory variables instead of the total subsidy, both as independent variables and as 
interacted variables with the location or not in nitrate surplus zones. For the sample 
including all regions, outside nitrate surplus zones only the premiums received for letting 
land aside (LSA) are capitalised. The capitalisation effect is very high, since the coefficient is 
31.8957. This may suggest a scarcity effect due to the requirement to withdraw land from 
production. Location in nitrate surplus zones greatly reinforces the capitalisation effect of 
these subsidies, as the coefficient for the interacted variable is 46.4733. Hence, in such zones, 
the total capitalisation effect is 78.4, meaning 3.13 Euros capitalised in the price of land for a 
one Euro LSA premium increase (provided that the discount rate is 4%). 
Such results for LSA are well above our benchmarks and one may suspect some collinear 
effects, especially with crop subsidy payments. In our database, the variable CHP (CAP first 
pillar coupled direct payments to crops and herds) do not allow to distinguish crop payments 
from herd payments. Results in Table 6 indicate that for the sample including all regions, the 
coefficient for CHP is not significant. Small or negligible capitalisation effects were expected 
for these rather coupled payments. However, the capitalisation coefficient of crop payments 
should be higher than the one of the herd payments, because crop payments are based on 
area while herd payments are provided per head. Given that the LSA payments are calculated 
with the same regional reference yield and the same crop reference price as crop payments, it 
is likely that the estimated LSA capitalisation coefficient captures part of the crop payment 
capitalisation effect.  
Still for the sample including all regions, the price of land located in nitrate surplus areas is 
also affected by the capitalisation of SFP (CAP first-pillar decoupled SFP) with a coefficient of 
2.4166. This decoupled payment was expected to be associated with the highest capitalisation 
coefficient among all types of subsidy, be the plot located in a surplus zone or not. Hence, 
once again, collinear effects may be present. 
Regarding the regional estimations, one must admit that obtained results are a little bit 
puzzling. In NUTS2 Brittany, only land set aside premiums (LSA) and coupled direct 
payments to crops and herds (CHP) have a significant capitalisation effect, whether located in 
a nitrate surplus zone or not. In addition, the capitalisation of land set aside premiums is 
greater outside nitrate surplus zone (coefficient of 233.82) than inside (coefficient of 151.9) 
and the estimated effect of the coupled direct payments to crops and herds is negative both 
for plots located outside (coefficient of -14.42) and inside (coefficient of -7.44) nitrate surplus 
area. As for the estimation with the three regions’ sample, we suspect collinear effects 
between land set aside premiums and crop payments. 
In NUTS2 Limousin, only the decoupled SFP (SFP) and the agri-environmental payments to 
extensive grazing livestock (EGL) are found to have a significant capitalisation impact. While 
for SFP the impact is positive as expected (coefficient of 12.94), the EGL effect is negative 
(coefficient of -42.24) which may be surprising. This negative effect may in fact reflect the 
lower productivity of the corresponding lands, since EGL payments are not supposed to bring 
additional profit to farmers, by construction, because they are calibrated to compensate 
farmers’ environmental efforts and additional costs. Although these voluntary measures are 
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not expected to be adopted when they decrease farm profit, Mettepeningen et al. (2009) 
observe almost as many profit decreasing situations as profit increasing ones. 
Finally, in NUTS3 Meuse, only the agri-environmental payments to extensive grazing 
livestock (EGL) have a significant capitalisation effect. But in this case the effect is positive. 
Once again, one may suspect collinear effects which would explain this very high EGL 
capitalisation impact. In this region the average EGL payment is 1.1 Euro per hectare. Over 
the period, these per hectare agri-environmental payments range between 45 Euros and 150 
Euros. This means that less than 2.5% of the regional UAA is concerned by such payments. 
This suggests that the EGL variable mainly indicates rare production systems which are more 
profitable than others in the region. 
Table 5. Results of the estimation of the determinants of land price for plots with size equal 
or above 10 hectares in 1994-2012, using the total subsidy variable 
 
All regions 
together 
NUTS2 region 
Brittany 
NUTS2 region 
Limousin 
NUTS3 region 
Meuse 
 Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Constant 2,097.5 ** 2,497.0 *** 1,590.4 *** 2,279.0 *** 
Plot’s municipality’s 
projected agricultural 
revenue per hectare of 
UAA 
0.0644  0.0692  -0.5603  -0.0669  
Plot’s municipality’s 
projected agricultural 
subsidies per hectare of 
UAA: total subsidies 
(TOT) 
0.6853 ** 0.1310  1.2346 *** 0.9539 *** 
Area of sold plot -8.0308 *** -14.5872 *** -6.8347 *** -2.4657  
Plot’s municipality’s area -0.0545 *** -0.0752 *** 0.0320  -0.0159  
Plot’s municipality’s 
population density 3.3169 *** 3.4714 *** 5.7655 *** 1.1346  
Dummy equal to 1 if plot’s 
municipality located in 
urban area 
237.07 * 134.93  909.09 *** -622.32  
Dummy equal to 1 if plot 
purchased by a farmer -228.87 *** -192.12 *** -214.56 ** -425.60 *** 
Dummy equal to 1 if plot 
purchased or sold by a 
SAFER 
230.10 *** 234.31 *** 99.16  618.24 *** 
Interacted variable TOT × 
Dummy equal to 1 if plot’s 
municipality located in 
nitrate surplus zone 
1.3693 *** 1.6144 *** n.i.  n.i.  
Model’s statistics         
F-value 31.7 *** 14.3 *** 7.1 *** 5.2 *** 
R-squared 0.200  0.133  0.205  0.157  
Number of observations 4,222  2,720  773  729  
Notes: The dependent variable is the deflated price of non-built arable and pasture land per hectare for plots 
sized 10 hectares or more; Results for year dummies and NUTS3 region dummies are not shown; Sig. means 
“Significance”; n.i. means “not included”; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1% levels respectively. 
Source: authors’ calculations 
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Table 6. Results of the estimation of the determinants of land price for plots with size equal 
or above 10 hectares in 1994-2012, using the subsidy categories’ variables 
 All regions 
together 
NUTS2 region 
Brittany 
NUTS2 region 
Limousin 
NUTS3 region 
Meuse 
 Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Constant 2,165.9 *** 2,221.5 *** 2,021.1 *** 2,127.1 *** 
Plot’s municipality’s 
projected agricultural 
revenue per hectare of UAA 
0.2559 *** 0.4991 *** 0.2301  -0.0650  
Plot’s municipality’s 
projected agricultural 
subsidies per hectare of 
UAA: 
        
CAP first-pillar coupled 
direct payments to crops 
and herds (CHP) 
-0.9645  -14.4155 *** 1.2803  0.3688  
CAP first-pillar land set-
aside premiums (LSA) 31.8957 ** 233.8178 *** 3.2054  -1.2452  
CAP first-pillar 
decoupled single farm 
payments (SFP) 
0.7962  0.2676  12.9379 *** 0.0884  
CAP second-pillar least 
favoured area payments 
(LFA) 
4.3644  n.i.  10.7674  n.i.  
CAP second-pillar agri-
environmental 
payments to extensive 
grazing livestock (EGL) 
-1.5909  n.i.  -42.2370 *** 140.1253 *** 
Area of sold plot -7.7295 *** -13.5935 *** -5.0567 ** -1.6611  
Plot’s municipality’s area -0.0524 *** -0.0679 *** 0.0628 *** -0.0499  
Plot’s municipality’s 
population density 3.1837 *** 3.1181 *** 4.9387 *** 1.4226  
Dummy equal to 1 if plot’s 
municipality located in 
urban area 
237.11 * 139.10  1,036.96  -701.94  
Dummy equal to 1 if plot 
purchased by a farmer -231.94 *** -201.34 *** -225.24 *** -374.72 *** 
Dummy equal to 1 if plot 
purchased or sold by a 
SAFER 
267.81 *** 268.77 *** 69.68  548.66 *** 
Interacted variable Subsidy 
× Dummy equal to 1 if plot’s 
municipality located in 
nitrate surplus zone 
        
Interaction with CHP -1.3435  6.9780 *** n.i.  n.i.  
Interaction with LSA 46.4733 * -81.9208 ** n.i.  n.i.  
Interaction with SFP 2.4166 *** 1.1633  n.i.  n.i.  
Interaction with LFA n.i.  n.i.  n.i.  n.i.  
Interaction with EGL n.i.  n.i.  n.i.  n.i.  
Model’s statistics         
F-value 27.8 *** 14.9 *** 9.1 *** 6.7 *** 
R-squared 0.206  0.155  0.275  0.212  
Number of observations 4,224  2,721  773  730  
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Notes: The dependent variable is the deflated land price per hectare; Results for year dummies and NUTS3 
region dummies are not shown; Sig. means “Significance”; n.i. means “not included”; *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, 1% levels respectively. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated the determinants of agricultural land price in several 
regions in France over the period 1994-2011 using individual plots transaction data, with a 
particular emphasis on agricultural subsidies and nitrate zoning regulations. 
We found several main results. Firstly, agricultural revenue has in general no significant 
influence on land price contrary to what can be expected from the present value model. Of 
course, we can first question the methodology that we used to proxy it at the municipality 
level from the original NUTS3 data, a limit which would also apply to subsidies. However, 
two other reasons may explain such a poor relationship. Firstly, it may be that the original 
variable (namely, pre-tax profit) used to construct our proxy variable, which is the only one 
that was available from the statistics, may not be the best representation of income generated 
by farming activities on land because it is too low in the accounting balance sheet; the gross 
margin would be a better candidate but it was not available in the original database. Another 
reason may be that the revenue variable was proxied at the municipality level and not at the 
plot level itself. 
Secondly, we found evidence that agricultural subsidies actually capitalised at least to some 
extent in the price of land in the regions studied over 1994-2011. However, the magnitude of 
such a capitalisation depends on several factors. One varying factor is the region considered. 
For the sample including the three regions, we found a positive but relatively small 
capitalisation effect of the total subsidies per hectare. However, this effect is differentiated 
according to the considered region. In NUTS2 Brittany the positive effect is significant only 
for plots located in nitrate surplus area and is greater than in both other regions. Then, the 
effect is greater in NUTS2 Limousin than in NUTS3 Meuse. Another varying factor is the type 
of subsidy considered. When considering the whole sample, we found that only land set-aside 
premiums significantly capitalise into land price, be the plot located in a surplus zone or not, 
while SFP have a significant positive capitalisation impact only for plots located in a surplus 
zone. We suspect however some collinear effects between the various types of subsidy 
considered which impedes disentangling the own effects of each type. This suspicion is 
confirmed by the rather puzzling estimation results obtained when all types of subsidy are 
considered. Hence, at this stage we recognise that further work is needed for improving our 
econometric specification. 
For this reason, it is felt premature to undertake simulations of the potential impacts of the 
future CAP proposals on agricultural land price in France, based on our estimated 
capitalisation coefficients. Collinear effects problems must be dealt with in priority. From our 
obtained preliminary results, we can expect contrasted effect of the future CAP reform. In 
France the basic decoupled allowance, which is similar to the SFP, will be reduced by half, 
and so will be its positive impact on the price of land. The new green payments, which must 
amount as much as 30% of the present first pillar CAP payments at the national level, 
themselves present as a mix between SFP, LSA premiums and EGL payments. Ecological 
compensation areas resembles LSA premiums but are supposed to be larger, with a positive 
effect on land price. However, the prescribed management plan for these areas may imply 
costs similar to the ones implied by agri-environmental schemes. Hence, the resulting effect 
is highly uncertain and very dependent on the new CAP implementation decisions.  
The different extent of capitalisation according to the type of subsidy and the region has 
already been shown in other studies, although not in France. However, another varying factor 
that has never been investigated in the literature is the zoning regulation. We found that, in 
NUTS2 Brittany, where the nitrate surplus zoning is implemented, the capitalisation of 
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subsidies is different whether the plot was inside or outside the zone, revealing a restriction 
on land mobility. This confirms the suggestion by Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) that laws 
and policies may affect the degree of land mobility between the different potential uses of 
land. As underlined by Latruffe and Le Mouël (2006), public intervention may affect land 
mobility in favour of a specific use of land, which may go against the government objective of 
supporting farmers’ income. In this paper we found that nitrate zoning regulations may 
increase the degree of capitalisation of subsidies in agricultural land price, implying a 
potential leakage of subsidies to non-agricultural stakeholders (non-farmer owners) and 
difficulties for farm succession and settlement.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. First-stage SUR estimation results 
Equation 
1994-2005 sub-period  2006-2011 sub-period 
Best model Adjusted 
model 
Best model Adjusted 
model 
CHP Obs. 96 96  40 40 
 SMSS 0.9814 0.9813  0.9300 0.9235 
 Cereals -7.545 (0.017)*** -7.556 (0.019)***  . . 
 Oilseeds . .  -8.878 (0.491)*** -10.623 (2.509)*** 
 Grassland -9.923 (0.352)*** -9.762 (0.298)***  . . 
 Dairy cows . .  -9.510 (0.170)*** -9.332 (0.137)*** 
 Suckler cows -8.242 (0.049)*** -8.252 (0.049)***  -8.498 (0.038)*** -8.498 (0.038)*** 
LSA Obs. 96 96  . . 
 SMSS 0.9427 0.9253  . . 
 Cereals -10.779 (0.447)*** -10.115 (0.036)***  . . 
 Oilseeds -10.321 (0.912)*** .  . . 
 Protein crops -8.602 (0.446)*** .  . . 
 Fodder maize -11.124 (0.986)*** .  . . 
 Starch -7.323 (0.243)*** .  . . 
SFP Obs. . .  40 40 
 SMSS . .  0.9944 0.9719 
 Cereals . .  -8.271 (0.159)*** -7.419 (0.036)*** 
 Oilseeds . .  -8.320 (0.390)*** . 
 Protein crops . .  -6.125 (0.164)*** . 
 Fodder maize . .  -7.323 (0.101)*** . 
 Suckler cows . .  -8.990 (0.087)*** -9.116 (0.107)*** 
LFA Obs. 96 96  40 40 
 SMSS 0.9450 0.9450  0.9817 0.9818 
 Suckler cows -9.492 (0.038)*** -9.493 (0.038)***  -9.951 (0.064)*** -9.969 (0.062)*** 
 Dairy ewe . .  -4.672 (0.118)*** -4.644 (0.109)*** 
EGL Obs. 96 96  40 40 
 SMSS 0.9688 0.9688  0.9432 0.9432 
 Rangeland -9.284 (0.240)*** -9.273 (0.235)***  . . 
 Suckler cows -10.553 (0.150)*** -10.559 (0.150)***  -10.181 (0.059)*** -10.182 (0.059)*** 
TOT Obs. 96 96  40 40 
 SMSS 0.9868 0.9869  0.9976 0.9977 
 Cereals -7.458 (0.017)*** -7.468 (0.018)***  -8.146 (0.140)*** -8.212 (0.106)*** 
 Oilseeds . .  -8.123 (0.385)*** -7.933 (0.240)*** 
 Fodder maize . .  -7.904 (0.297)*** -8.729 (0.710)*** 
 Grassland -9.470 (0.228)*** -9.362 (0.208)***  . . 
 Dairy cows . .  -8.509 (0.176)*** -8.124 (0.144)*** 
 Suckler cows -7.775 (0.037)*** -7.781 (0.037)***  -7.608 (0.024)*** -7.593 (0.023)*** 
Revenue Obs. 96 96  40 40 
 SMSS 0.9518 0.9195  0.9205 0.7682 
 Soft wheat -0.0034 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.0031 
(0.0005)*** 
 0.0013 
(0.0007)*      
-0.0011 
(0.0009)       
 Barley 0.0023 
(0.0007)*** 
0.0028 
(0.0006)*** 
 -0.0020 
(0.0007)*** 
0.0013 
(0.0009)       
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 Corn maize . .  -0.0028 
(0.0006)*** 
. 
 Protein crops . .  0.0256 
(0.0042)*** 
. 
 Fodder maize . .  -0.0095 
(0.0010)*** 
. 
 Total maize 0.0014 
(0.0006)**   
.  . . 
 Ley 0.0607 
(0.0103)*** 
.  . . 
 Meadows -0.0007 
(0.0003)*** 
.  . . 
 Grassland -0.0009 
(0.0002)*** 
.  . . 
 Dairy cows 0.0011 
(0.0004)*** 
0.0018 
(0.0002)*** 
 0.0036 
(0.0004)*** 
0.0009 
(0.0003)*** 
 Suckler cows 0.0013 
(0.0002)*** 
0.0002 
(0.0000)*** 
 0.0002 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.0001 
(0.0000)**   
 Pigs . .  0.0001 
(0.0000)*** 
. 
Notes: CHP, LSA, SFP, LFA, EGL, and TOT are the six types of subsidies considered (see text); SMSS means 
‘Share of Model Sum of Squares’ and represents the share of the total sum of squares explained by the model; Obs. 
means “Number of observations”; Standard deviations appear in brackets after the estimated coefficient; *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at, respectively, 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on SSP, SAA 1994-2011 and SSP, CRA 1994-2011. 
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